Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300464 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 24-398
Publisher: 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI
Abstract: 
Adam Smith alleged that employers often secretly combine to reduce labor earnings. This paper examines an important case of such behavior: illegal no-poaching agreements through which information-technology companies agreed not to compete for each other's workers. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of a U.S. Department of Justice investigation, I estimate the effects of these agreements using a difference-in-difference design. Data from Glassdoor permit the inclusion of rich employer- and job-level controls. On average the no-poaching agreements reduced salaries at colluding firms by 5.6 percent, consistent with considerable employer market power. Stock bonuses and job satisfaction were also negatively affected.
Subjects: 
No-poach agreement
employer market power
Silicon Valley
tech companies
Glassdoor
compensation
JEL: 
J42
K42
L41
K21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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