Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300948 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17052
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
In a labor market model with cheap talk, employers can send messages about their willingness to pay for higher-ability workers, which job-seekers can use to direct their search and tailor their wage bid. Introducing such messages leads – under certain conditions – to an informative separating equilibrium that affects the number of applications, types of applications, and wage bids across rms. This model is used to interpret an experiment conducted in a large online labor market: employers were given the opportunity to state their relative willingness to pay for more experienced workers, and workers can easily condition their search on this information. Preferences were collected for all employers but only treated employers had their signal revealed to job-seekers. In response to revelation of the cheap talk signal, job-seekers targeted their applications to employers of the right "type," and they tailored their wage bids, affecting who was matched to whom and at what wage. The treatment increased measures of match quality through better sorting, illustrating the power of cheap talk for talent matching.
Subjects: 
sorting
cheap-talk
gig-economy
freelancer
field-experiment
online job search platform
JEL: 
J64
D83
C87
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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