Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300974 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17078
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This study investigates dishonest behavior among cocoa middlemen in Côte d'Ivoire, focusing on the role of observability and financial penalties in deterring such behavior. Using on a modified version of the "die-under-cup task", we examine the cheating behaviors of 151 cocoa middlemen over several interaction rounds. Our findings reveal that cheating is prevalent among cocoa middlemen, with 78% of players cheating at least once during the game. However, we found heterogeneous cheating patterns: 59% of cocoa middlemen consistently cheated when faced with a losing outcome, even when the risk of detection and sanction is high, 22% of them never cheated, and 19% did so occasionally. Key factors influencing cheating include age, religion, and risk attitudes. The study finds that introducing monitoring and sanctions significantly reduces cheating, highlighting the effectiveness of such mechanisms in deterring dishonest behaviors. By shedding light on the prevalence and determinants of cheating among cocoa middlemen, this study contributes to the experimental literature on dishonest behavior and understanding middlemen's role in agricultural value chains.
Subjects: 
dishonesty
middlemen
agricultural value chain
observability
financial penalties
lab-in-the-field experiment
JEL: 
C91
C93
D82
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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