Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/301189 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
AWI Discussion Paper Series No. 749
Publisher: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including all-but-one, are fully efficient.
Subjects: 
bargaining
commitment
conflict
delay
international negotiations
climate negotiations
legislative
multilateral
voting
majority
unanimity
JEL: 
C7
D7
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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