Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/301189 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
AWI Discussion Paper Series No. 749
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including all-but-one, are fully efficient.
Schlagwörter: 
bargaining
commitment
conflict
delay
international negotiations
climate negotiations
legislative
multilateral
voting
majority
unanimity
JEL: 
C7
D7
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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