Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/301225 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2024/7
Publisher: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Abstract: 
The paper analyses the role of national central banks (NCBs) in the governance of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), NCBs are the owners of the European Central Bank (ECB), and their governors dominate the ECB's Governing Council, but in monetary policy operations, NCBs are subordinated to the ECB, The dominance of NCB governors has materially affected Governing Council decisions on relations between NCBs and the ECB, allowing the NCBs to maintain some of their erstwhile glory, sometimes in contradiction to the primary law. Examples involve the monetary funding of investments declared as non-monetary, violations of Treaty provisions for the allocation of income from monetary policy operations, and accounting rules that obfuscate the boundary between ECB-subordinate and independent activities of NCBs, The net effect of these developments is to enlarge the domain of NCB activities.
Subjects: 
European Monetary Union
European System of Central Banks
Governance of the Eurosystem
ANFA
ELA
PSPP
Central-Bank Accounting and Balance Sheets
JEL: 
E50
E58
F53
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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