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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11169
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the incentive of an ad-funded social media platform to curb the presence of unsafe content that entails reputational risk to advertisers. We identify conditions for the platform not to moderate unsafe content and demonstrate how the optimal moderation policy depends on the risk the advertisers face. The platform is likely to under-moderate unsafe content relative to the socially desirable level when both advertisers and users have congruent preferences for unsafe content and to over-moderate unsafe content when advertisers have conflicting preferences for unsafe content. Finally, to mitigate negative externalities generated by unsafe content, we study the implications of a policy that mandates binding content moderation to online platforms and how the introduction of taxes on social media activity and social media platform competition can distort the platform’s moderation strategies.
Schlagwörter: 
advertising
content moderation
social media platforms
toxic content
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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