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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30493
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Dragu, Tiberiu | en |
dc.contributor.author | Polborn, Mattias | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-01-04 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T08:20:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T08:20:15Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30493 | - |
dc.description.abstract | How does electoral accountability affect the effectiveness of terrorism prevention in a democ- racy? We analyze the connection between electoral accountability and policy effectiveness in the context of terrorism prevention. We develop a formal model of an interaction between a government, a minority community, and a representative voter. All actors share the objective of terrorism prevention and have symmetric information. We show that electoral pressures to be successful in terrorism prevention create a commitment problem for the government and this can lead to less security. If the representative voter cares more about terrorism prevention, the government intensifies anti-terrorism activities that are under its direct control, but cooperation by the minority community weakens, and, as a result, security may decrease. We also show that commitment to ex-post suboptimal anti-terrorism activity is desirable for the government, but such commitment is difficult to achieve without explicit institutional constraints such as an effective judicial review on government's antiterrorism actions. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2864 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D70 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | terrorism | en |
dc.subject.keyword | elections | en |
dc.subject.keyword | accountability | en |
dc.title | Terrorism prevention and electoral accountability | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 615599575 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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