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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30549
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Demougin, Dominique M. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Fabel, Oliver | en |
dc.contributor.author | Thomann, Christian | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-06-29 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T08:22:01Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T08:22:01Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30549 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We derive the optimal contract between a principal and a liquidity-constrained agent in a stochastically repeated environment. The contract comprises a court-enforceable explicit bonus rule and an implicit fixed salary promise that must be self-enforcing. Since the agent's rent increases with bonus pay, the principal implements the maximum credible salary promise. Thus, the bonus increases while the salary promise and the agent's effort decrease with a higher probability of premature contract termination. We subject this mechanism to econometric testing using personnel data of an insurance company. The empirical results strongly support our theoretical predictions. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2645 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M5 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | implicit contract | en |
dc.subject.keyword | explicit bonus pay | en |
dc.subject.keyword | premature contract termination | en |
dc.subject.keyword | compensation and productivity estimates | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anreizvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Implizite Kontrakte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsanreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Provision | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Versicherungsvermittlung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Deutschland | en |
dc.title | Implicit vs. explicit incentives : theory and a case study | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 603334865 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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