Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31167 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1411
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We study how the launching of a do-not-spam registry will affect the internet's efficiency. We show that as long as the cost of sending spam messages is not high, having rich users (who have high-quality filters) join the registry has the desirable effect of lowering the number of spam messages sent to each user, while having poor users (who have low-quality filters) join the registry has the opposite undesirable effect. We also show that the registry improves the total efficiency of the internet - as long as the cost of sending spam messages is not high; as more users join, the total number of spam messages sent to all users decreases.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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