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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Shneyerov, Artyom | en |
dc.contributor.author | Wong, Adam Chi Leung | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T10:19:09Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T10:19:09Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31237 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. We first consider generalized random-proposer take-it-or-leave-it offer games (GRP TIOLI games). This class of games includes a simple random-proposer TIOLI game, but also many other interesting bargaining games. A friction parameter is t , the length of the time period until the next meeting. We find that as t - O, all market equilibria converge to the Walrasian limit, at the fastest possible rate O(t) among all bargaining mechanisms. Some important bargaining games not in this class may have non-convergent market equilibria. This is the case for the k-double auction: we find that there are equilibria that converge at a linear rate, those that converge at a slower rate or even not converge at all. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, IL | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDiscussion Paper |x1467 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C73 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D83 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Matching and bargaining | en |
dc.subject.keyword | search | en |
dc.subject.keyword | double auctions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | foundations for perfect competition | en |
dc.subject.keyword | rate of convergence | en |
dc.title | The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 587666633 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1467 | en |
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