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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Dekel, Eddie | en |
dc.contributor.author | Jackson, Matthew O. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Wolinsky, Asher | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T10:19:20Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T10:19:20Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31252 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by oþering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, IL | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDiscussion Paper |x1433 | en |
dc.subject.jel | P16 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | vote buying | en |
dc.subject.keyword | lobbying | en |
dc.subject.keyword | legislatures | en |
dc.subject.keyword | political economy | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politische Partei | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wahl | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wahlverhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Vote buying II: legislatures and lobbying | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 587536950 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1433 | en |
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