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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32196
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bierbrauer, Felix | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-01-27 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T12:01:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T12:01:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32196 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study the provision of an excludable public good to discuss whether the imposition of participation constraints is desirable. It is shown that this question may equivalently be cast as follows: should a firm that produces a public good receive tax revenues, or face a self-financing requirement. The main result is that the desirability of participation constraints is shaped by an equity-efficiency tradeoff: While first-best is out of reach with participation constraints, their imposition yields a more equitable distribution of the surplus. This result relies on an incomplete contracts perspective. With a benevolent mechanism designer, participation constraints are never desirable. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,01 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D86 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H41 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L51 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Mechanism Design | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Incomplete Contracts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Public Goods | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Regulation | en |
dc.title | Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 617292698 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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