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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35822
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | von Siemens, Ferdinand | en |
dc.contributor.author | Kosfeld, Michael | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-05-07 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-07T11:58:51Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-07T11:58:51Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090513220 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35822 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents - an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the respective principal - can solve the equilibrium existence problem, even when the size of the externalities is arbitrarily small. Our result highlights the degree of control a principal has over the attractiveness of his contracts as an important feature for equilibrium existence, thereby offering a new perspective on existing theories of competition in markets with adverse selection. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x4125 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D86 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Asymmetric information | en |
dc.subject.keyword | competition | en |
dc.subject.keyword | adverse selection | en |
dc.subject.keyword | externality | en |
dc.subject.stw | Marktmechanismus | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Asymmetrische Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Adverse Selection | en |
dc.subject.stw | Externer Effekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Versicherungsökonomik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Negative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 599383712 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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