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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bieta, Volker | en |
dc.contributor.author | Broll, Udo | en |
dc.contributor.author | Siebe, Wilfried | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-15T09:39:23Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-15T09:39:23Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36482 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models. In our banking model each project of a borrower is described by a continuous density of outcomes. Different density functions are classified according to second stochastisch dominance. Combining these features we find that in a banking model collateral is no longer in a position to signal the degree of riskiness of the borrower to the lender. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aTechnische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften |cDresden | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x04/08 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D8 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G20 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Signaling | en |
dc.subject.keyword | collateral | en |
dc.subject.keyword | perfect Bayesian equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.stw | Signalling | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kreditgeschäft | en |
dc.subject.stw | Asymmetrische Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Bayes-Statistik | en |
dc.title | The banking firm: the role of signaling with collaterals | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 590241001 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:tuddps:0408 | en |
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