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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38864
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Grechenig, Kristoffel | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sekyra, Michael | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-06-09 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-18T11:11:11Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-18T11:11:11Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38864 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of derivate share-holder suits. We explain this phenomenon on the basis of percentage limits which require share-holders to hold a minimum amount of shares in order to bring a lawsuit. We show that, under this legal regime, managers will collude with large shareholders by means of settlements or bribes that impose a negative externality on small shareholders. Contrary to conventional agency models, we find that large shareholders do not monitor the management; as a consequence, there is no free riding opportunity for small shareholders. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,15 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K22 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K42 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G30 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Derivative Shareholder Suits | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Percentage Limits | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Collusion | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Monitoring | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Free Riding | en |
dc.subject.stw | Corporate Governance | en |
dc.subject.stw | Aktionäre | en |
dc.subject.stw | Zivilprozess | en |
dc.subject.stw | Führungskräfte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Multinationales Unternehmen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Europa | en |
dc.subject.stw | USA | en |
dc.title | No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 627560288 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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