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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39850
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kolmar, Martin | en |
dc.contributor.author | Wagener, Andreas | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-31 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-10T11:58:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-09-10T11:58:12Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39850 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Contests between groups are plagued by intra-group externalities (freeriding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might not be desirable, neither individually nor socially. In contests among two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound strength differences between groups. If both groups rein in their intra-group externalities, they are both worse off, compared to a situation with free-riding, if they are relatively similar. If they are sufficiently heterogenous, the weak group loses at the expense of the relatively strong group. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x3157 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Z13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | N40 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D74 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | conflict | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incentives | en |
dc.subject.keyword | group-size paradox | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gruppenarbeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsorganisation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Betrieblicher Konflikt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsanreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wirtschaftliche Effizienz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Inefficient group organization as optimal adaption to dominant environments | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 634266233 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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