Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments

Neugebauer, Tibor; Perote, Javier; Schmidt, Ulrich; Loos, Malte

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/4066

Title:

Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments

Authors:

Neugebauer, Tibor
Perote, Javier
Schmidt, Ulrich
Loos, Malte

Year of Publication:

2007

Series/Report no.:

Kiel Working Paper No. 1376

Publisher:

Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel

Abstract:

In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a variation of information feedback and an elicitation of individual beliefs about others' contributions. Altogether, our data support the hypothesis of conditional cooperation with a selfish bias.

Subjects:

Information feedback
Public goods
Voluntary contributions
Conditional cooperation
Experimental economics

JEL:

C72
C92
H41

Document Type:

Working Paper

Appears in Collections:

Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des Kiel Instituts für Weltwirtschaft (IfW Kiel)

Files in This Item:

File

Description

Size