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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Tavoni, Alessandro | en |
dc.contributor.author | Schlüter, Maja | en |
dc.contributor.author | Levin, Simon | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-12-22T10:42:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-12-22T10:42:12Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43451 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilano | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aNota di Lavoro |x2010,127 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C73 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q20 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D70 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Cooperation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Social Norm | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Ostracism | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Common Pool Resource | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Evolutionary Game Theory | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Replicator Equation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Agent-based Simulation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics | en |
dc.title | The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 64118221X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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