A value for cephoidal NTU-games

Rosenmüller, Joachim

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43828

Title:

A value for cephoidal NTU-games

Authors:

Rosenmüller, Joachim

Year of Publication:

2007

Series/Report no.:

Working Papers No. 388

Publisher:

Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld

Abstract:

A cephoid is an algebraic ('Minkowski') sum of finitely many prisms in R. A cephoidal game is an NTU game the feasible sets of which are cephoids. We provide a version of the Shapley NTU value for such games based on the bargaining solution of Maschler-Perles.

Subjects:

Cephoids
Bargaining theory
Bargaining solution
NTU games
NTU value

Persistent Identifier of the first edition:

urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-10994

Document Type:

Working Paper

Appears in Collections:

Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University

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