Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46335
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kolmar, Martin | en |
dc.contributor.author | Rommeswinkel, Hendrik | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-05-24 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-29T11:17:01Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-06-29T11:17:01Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46335 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The present paper analyzes situations in which groups compete for rents. A major result in the literature has been that there are both cases where larger groups have advantages and cases where they have disadvantages. The paper provides two intuitive criteria which for groups with homogenous valuations of the rent determine whether there are advantages or disadvantages for larger groups. For groups with heterogenous valuations the complementarity of group members' efforts is shown to play a role as a further factor. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x3362 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D74 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H41 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | contests | en |
dc.subject.keyword | public goods | en |
dc.subject.keyword | group-size paradox | en |
dc.subject.stw | Interessenvertretung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Soziale Gruppe | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliches Gut | en |
dc.subject.stw | Rent Seeking | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Technological determinants of the group-size paradox | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 659489015 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.