Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46466
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Verbon, Harrie A. A. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Withagen, Cees A. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-11-25 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-29T11:19:38Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-06-29T11:19:38Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46466 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In the standard setting a system of tradable permits is effective and cost-efficient in attaining the policy objective of pollution reduction. This outcome is challenged in case of a tradable permit system in a federal system/constitution with individual states having discretionary power regarding environmental policy and where pollution is transboundary across states. This paper explores the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness and efficiency of the system, under various institutional arrangements, through the initial allocation of permits. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x3236 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H21 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H23 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q00 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | tradable permits | en |
dc.subject.keyword | fiscal federalism | en |
dc.subject.stw | Emissionsrechte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Emissionshandel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzföderalismus | en |
dc.subject.stw | Umweltpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Allokation | en |
dc.title | Do permit allocations matter? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 640576877 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.