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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/48735
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bade, Sophie | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-08-12T09:51:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-08-12T09:51:46Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48735 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The paper introduces the assumption of costly information acquisition to the theory of mechanism design for matching allocation problems. It is shown that the assumption of endogenous information acquisition greatly changes some of the cherished results in that theory: in particular, the first-best might not be implementable. Moreover, it might not even be possible to implement the second-best through trade. In addition, the paper highlights the use of randomness in setting incentives for efficient learning. The trade-offs among simultaneous and sequential learning and among efficient learning and efficient allocations are discussed. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburg | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2011: Die Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft: Lektionen aus der Krise - Session: Information Economics |xB14-V1 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C70 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D50 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Serial Dictatorship | en |
dc.subject.keyword | House Allocation Problems | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Endogenous Information | en |
dc.title | Matching Allocation Problems with Endogenous Information Acquisition | - |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 671640089 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:vfsc11:48735 | en |
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