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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49657
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Nosenzo, Daniele | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-03 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-09-26T13:23:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-09-26T13:23:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49657 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This study uses a three-person gift-exchange game experiment to examine the impact of pay comparisons on effort behavior. We compare effort choices made in a treatment where workers' wages are secret with effort choices made in two 'public wages' treatments. The two 'public wages' treatments differ in whether co-workers' wages are chosen by an employer, or are fixed exogenously by the experimenter. We find that pay comparison information has an overall detrimental impact on effort choices: employees respond less favorably to the wage offers made by the employer when they receive information about the wage paid to the co-worker as compared to the case where co-workers' wages are secret. These effects are particularly pronounced in the treatment where the level of the co-worker's wage is fixed exogenously. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottingham | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2010-03 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C91 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C92 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J31 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | social comparisons | en |
dc.subject.keyword | wage comparisons | en |
dc.subject.keyword | gift exchange | en |
dc.subject.keyword | experiments | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökonomischer Anreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohn | en |
dc.subject.stw | Vergleich | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Test | en |
dc.title | The impact of pay comparisons on effort behavior | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 632208392 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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