Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49920
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Schöb, Ronnie | en |
dc.contributor.author | Thum, Marcel | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-09-23 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-09-27T16:12:36Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-09-27T16:12:36Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49920 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Individual labour productivities are often unobservable for firms when hiring new workers. Job protection may prevent firms ex post from using information about labour productivities. We show that a binding minimum wage introduced in the presence of job protection will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and full information. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFreie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDiskussionsbeiträge |x2011/14 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J2 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H5 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L5 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Minimum wages | en |
dc.subject.keyword | unemployment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | hidden information | en |
dc.subject.keyword | labour market regulation | en |
dc.title | Job protection renders minimum wages less harmful | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 668790776 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201114 | en |
Datei(en):
Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.