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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/52787
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-12-14T09:39:24Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-12-14T09:39:24Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52787 | - |
dc.description.abstract | With the help of a simple model of production and trade, we examine the differential impact of tariff escalation on skilled and unskilled wages in an economy. Our findings provide a lobbying-based explanation of the prevalence of tariff escalation in developed countries. It also predicts the possible response of a developing country and shows how similar lobbying activity in that country can slow the pace of liberalization of service sector trade. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aThe United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) |cHelsinki | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWIDER Discussion Paper |x2003/62 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F01 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F13 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | escalation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | tariff | en |
dc.subject.keyword | lobby | en |
dc.subject.keyword | developing country | en |
dc.subject.keyword | WTO | en |
dc.subject.stw | Zolltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Protektionismus | en |
dc.subject.stw | Interessenpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Entwicklungsländer | en |
dc.title | Who gains from tariff escalation? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 375550666 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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