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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Ilkiliç, Rahmi | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-12-15T11:34:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-12-15T11:34:55Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53425 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilano | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aNota di Lavoro |x32.2009 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C62 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D85 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L11 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Cournot Markets | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Networks | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Nash Equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Centrality Measures | en |
dc.title | Cournot competition on a network of markets and firms | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 645053813 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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