Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55577 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers No. 07-9
Publisher: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, MA
Abstract: 
This paper examines image motivationthe desire to be liked and well-regarded by others as a driver in prosocial behavior (doing good), and asks whether extrinsic monetary incentives (doing well) have a detrimental effect on prosocial behavior due to crowding out of image motivation. By definition, image depends on one's behavior being visible to other people. Using this unique property we show that image is indeed an important part of the motivation to behave prosocially. Moreover, we show that extrinsic incentives interact with image motivation and are therefore less effective in public than in private. Together, these results imply that image motivation is crowded out by monetary incentives; this means that monetary incentives are more likely to be counterproductive for public prosocial activities than for private ones.
JEL: 
D64
C90
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
458.17 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.