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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56051
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Lohse, Tim | en |
dc.contributor.author | Robledo, Julio R. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-16 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-26T15:04:07Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-03-26T15:04:07Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56051 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Motivated by recent disasters, this paper analyzes the risk sharing aspect in a federation. The regions can be hit by a shock leading to losses that occur with an exogenous probability and in a stochastically independent way. The regions can spend effort on selfinsurance to reduce the size of the loss. Being part of a federation has two countervailing -elfare effects. On the one hand, there is the well known welfare increase due to risk pooling. On the other hand, the self-insurance effort is a public good, because all regions benefit from the reduction of the loss. There exists a Samaritan's dilemma kind of effect whereby regions reduce their self-insurance effort potentially leading to an overall welfare decrease. The central government can solve this dilemma by committing to fixed rather than variable transfers. This induces regions that behave non-cooperatively to still choose the efficient level of self-insurance effort. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWZB Discussion Paper |xSP II 2012-103 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H77 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H41 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | intergovernmental transfers | en |
dc.subject.keyword | self-insurance | en |
dc.subject.keyword | disaster policy | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzausgleich | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gefangenendilemma | en |
dc.subject.stw | Katastrophenhilfe | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schock | en |
dc.subject.stw | Selbstversicherung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Public self-insurance and the Samaritan's dilemma in a federation | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 688719341 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:SPII2012103 | en |
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