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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57177
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Gürtler, Marc | en |
dc.contributor.author | Gürtler, Oliver | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-04-11 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-04-18T08:28:05Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-04-18T08:28:05Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | doi:10.2139/ssrn.2031582 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57177 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts in a model with selfish and fair principals. Fair principals are willing to honor implicit agreements, whereas selfish principals are not. Principals are privately informed about their types. We investigate a separating equilibrium in which principals reveal their type through the contract o er to the agent. If this equilibrium is played, explicit and implicit contracts are substitutes. Since the agent learns the principal's type, a selfish principal has to rely on explicit incentives. A fair principal, by contrast, can effectively induce implicit incentives and hence does not need to use explicit incentives. Interestingly, if a selfish principal can rely on more effective explicit incentives, a fair principal becomes more likely to be able to separate from the selfish type and, hence, to make better use of implicit incentives. In this sense, there is a strategic complementarity between explicit and implicit incentives. | en |
dc.language.iso | ger | en |
dc.publisher | |aTechnische Universität Braunschweig, Institut für Finanzwirtschaft |cBraunschweig | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Paper Series |xIF38V1 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D86 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M52 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | explicit contracts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | implicit contracts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | separating equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.keyword | substitutes | en |
dc.subject.keyword | strategic | en |
dc.subject.keyword | complementarity | en |
dc.title | The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 689985908 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:tbsifw:IF38V1 | en |
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