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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57263
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Eichner, Thomas | en |
dc.contributor.author | Pethig, Rüdiger | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-02-15 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-04-18T14:54:25Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-04-18T14:54:25Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57263 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the extraction path of world fossil energy resources (= world carbon emissions). We consider governments having sign-unconstrained emission taxes at their disposal and seeking to prevent world emissions from exceeding some binding aggregate emission ceiling in the medium term. Such a ceiling policy can be carried out either in full cooperation of all (major) carbon emitting countries or by a sub-global climate coalition. Unilateral action has to cope with carbon leakage and high costs which makes a strong case for choosing a policy that implements the ceiling in a cost-effective way. In a two-country two-period general equilibrium model with a non-renewable fossil-energy resource we characterize the unilateral cost-effective ceiling policy and compare it with its fully cooperative counterpart. We show that with full cooperation there exists a cost-effective ceiling policy in which only first-period emissions are taxed at a rate that is uniform across countries. In contrast, the cost-effective ceiling policy of a sub-global climate coalition is characterized by emission regulation in both periods. That policy may consist either of positive tax rates in both periods or of negative tax rates (= subsidies) in both periods or of a positive rate in the first and a negative rate in the second period. The share of the total stock of energy resources owned by the sub-global climate coalition turns out to be a decisive determinant of the sign and magnitude of unilateral cost-effective taxes. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht |cSiegen | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge |x151-11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H22 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q32 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q54 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | unilateral climate policy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | intertemporal climate policy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | non-renewable energy resources | en |
dc.subject.keyword | emission taxes | en |
dc.subject.stw | Klimaschutz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Internationale Umweltpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kohlendioxid | en |
dc.subject.stw | Intertemporale Allokation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökosteuer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Optimale Besteuerung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Flattening the carbon extraction path in unilateral costeffective action | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 685359581 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:sie:siegen:151-11 | en |
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