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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Ke, Changxia | en |
dc.contributor.author | Konrad, Kai A. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Morath, Florian | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-06-05 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-06-11T10:53:27Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-06-11T10:53:27Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWZB Discussion Paper |xSP II 2012-104 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D74 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | conflict | en |
dc.subject.keyword | contest | en |
dc.subject.keyword | alliance | en |
dc.subject.keyword | hold-up problem | en |
dc.subject.keyword | experiment | en |
dc.subject.stw | Konflikt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Bündnissystem | en |
dc.subject.stw | Sunk Costs | en |
dc.subject.stw | Test | en |
dc.title | Alliances in the shadow of conflict | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 717085090 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:SPII2012104 | en |
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