Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62895 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 572
Publisher: 
Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics, London
Abstract: 
We introduce and characterize a new class of bargaining solutions: those which can be obtained by sequentially applying two binary relations to eliminate alternatives. As a by-product we obtain as a particular case a partial characterization result by Zhou (Econometrica, 1997) of an extension of the Nash axioms and solution to domains including non-convex problems, as well as a complete characterizations of solutions that satisfy Pareto optimality, Covariance with positive affine transformations, and Independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Subjects: 
Bargaining, Non-convex problems, Nash bargaining solution
JEL: 
C72
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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