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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/66233
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Dulleck, Uwe | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-11-07 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-11-19T15:21:58Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-11-19T15:21:58Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1997 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064273 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66233 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium players use strategies that condition on the number of messages sent. Therefore - induction under the assumption of bounded rational behavior of at least one player leads to a more intuitive equilibrium in the E-mail game. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHumboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSFB 373 Discussion Paper |x1997,47 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Induction | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Subgame Perfect Equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Information sets | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Imperfect recall | en |
dc.title | A note on the E-mail game: Bounded rationality and induction | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 729366219 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199747 | en |
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