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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Casarico, Alessandra | en |
dc.contributor.author | Facchini, Giovanni | en |
dc.contributor.author | Frattini, Tommaso | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-11-23 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-11-27T10:40:42Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-11-27T10:40:42Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66875 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We develop a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic tradeoffs faced by a government in the decision to implement an immigration amnesty in the presence of a selective immigration policy. We show that two channels play an important role: an amnesty is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by the channels identified in our theoretical model. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x3981 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F22 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J61 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | illegal immigration | en |
dc.subject.keyword | amnesties | en |
dc.subject.keyword | labor market mismatch | en |
dc.subject.keyword | welfare state | en |
dc.subject.stw | Illegale Einwanderung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Straffreiheit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Migrationspolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsmarktflexibilität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Sozialstaat | en |
dc.subject.stw | OECD-Staaten | en |
dc.title | What drives immigration amnesties? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 730412008 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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