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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFS Working Papers No. 07/03
Verlag: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London
Zusammenfassung: 
We derive distributional e¤ects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to di¤erent public goods or they contribute to at most one common good. The former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of Lundberg and Pollak (1993). The second outcome yields (local) income pooling. A household will be in di¤erent regimes depending on the distribution of income within the household. Any bargaining model with this non-cooperative case as a breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling. We conclude that targeting bene.ts such as child bene.ts to one household member may not always have an e¤ect on outcomes.
Schlagwörter: 
Nash equilibrium
Nash bargaining
collective models
intra-household allocation
local income pooling
separate spheres
JEL: 
D10
C71
C72
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
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