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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 07/2011
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
I consider a situation, where the agent can acquire payoff-relevant information either before or after the contract is signed. To raise efficiency, the principal might solicit information; to retain all surplus, however, she must prevent precontractual information gathering. The following class of stochastic contracts may solve this trade-off optimally: before signing, information acquisition is not solicited, and afterwards randomly. The key insight is that randomization makes precontractual information costlier for the agent.
Schlagwörter: 
Information acquisition
Principal-agent
Mechanism design
Randomization
JEL: 
D82
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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