Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/72667 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4225
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the implications of potential offenders caring about their relative status. We establish that subjects' status concerns can result in multiple-equilibrium crime rates and may modify the standard comparative-statics results regarding how the crime rate changes in response to a higher detection probability and higher sanctions. In addition, we argue that the socially optimal level of the detection probability and the sanction will often be higher when potential offenders care about their relative positions. Our analysis can be linked to one of the most important criminological theories of crime, namely strain theory.
Subjects: 
crime
status
deterrence
multiple equilibria
strain theory
JEL: 
H23
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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