Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73787 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ifo Working Paper No. 71
Verlag: 
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
In the current recession, politicians grant state aid of yet unknown dimensions. But whatis the most efficient measure for granting such aid? We use a theoretical model withfirms that differ in their creditworthiness and compare different types of direct subsidieswith indirectly subsidized loans. We find that, in a large parameter range, politiciansprefer subsidized loans to direct subsidies, because these avoid windfall gains to entrepreneurs,and they economize on screening costs. For similar reasons, subsidized loansmay increase social welfare relative to subsidies. From a welfare perspective, politiciansuse subsidized loans inefficiently often.
Schlagwörter: 
State aid
subsidized loans
public bank
governance
JEL: 
G21
G38
H25
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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