Banking capital and risk-taking adjustment under capital regulation: The role of financial freedom, concentration and governance control

Abstract

This study analyzes the relevance of capital adjustment and risk-taking adjustment during the financial tsunami when the banking industry was under capital regulation. Using the panel data of commercial banks in the USA and non-USA from 2003 to 2009, we consider the effects of financial freedom, concentration and governance control simultaneously by three-stage least square analysis. The results show that capital and risk adjustment are positively correlated for both USA and non-USA banking industry, which are consistent after the financial tsunami. This applies to the verification of the capital buffer theory. In addition, for banks with low capital adequacy ratio, capital and risk adjustment are negatively correlated. This applies to the verification of bankruptcy cost avoidance theory and managerial risk aversion theory. Finally, banks with lower capital ratio will be faster in the adjustment of risk-taking as compared with banks with higher capital ratio. This study recommended that supervision should be coupled with governance control to achieve the goal of reducing risk-taking.This study analyzes the relevance of capital adjustment and risk-taking adjustment during the financial tsunami when the banking industry was under capital regulation. Using the panel data of commercial banks in the USA and non-USA from 2003 to 2009, we consider the effects of financial freedom, concentration and governance control simultaneously by three-stage least square analysis. The results show that capital and risk adjustment are positively correlated for both USA and non-USA banking industry, which are consistent after the financial tsunami. This applies to the verification of the capital buffer theory. In addition, for banks with low capital adequacy ratio, capital and risk adjustment are negatively correlated. This applies to the verification of bankruptcy cost avoidance theory and managerial risk aversion theory. Finally, banks with lower capital ratio will be faster in the adjustment of risk-taking as compared with banks with higher capital ratio. This study recommended that supervision should be coupled with governance control to achieve the goal of reducing risk-taking.