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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 373
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown by the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skillful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.
Schlagwörter: 
Auctions
contests
litigation
fee-shifting
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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