Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/75768 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 563
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
The large international bailouts of the 1990s have been criticized for differentreasons, in particular for generating moral hazard at the expense of theglobal taxpayer. We argue in this paper that some of these concerns areexaggerated or misleading because international bailouts have no or verylittle cost to the international community and the global taxpayer. Theproblem, in our view, is rather to ensure that the international safety net isnot used as an input into bad domestic policies. This may require a shifttowards ex ante conditionality, in the sense that the availability and size ofofficial crisis lending need to be conditional on government policies beforethe crisis.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
172.38 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.