Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/75864 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 555
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers family formation and reciprocity-based cooperation in the form of sharing of earnings-risk. While risk sharing is one benefit to marriage it is also limited by divorce risk. With search in the marriage market there may be multiple equilibria diering not only in divorce rates but also in the role of marriage in providing informal insurance. Publicly provided insurance, despite potential equilibrium multiplicity, is shown to aect family formation and financial cooperation monotonically. Some aspects of the model are then tested using international survey data and a bivariate probit model with sample selection.
Schlagwörter: 
Marriage
divorce
risk-sharing
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
364.86 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.