Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76148 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 0416
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, Zurich
Abstract: 
We analyse interethnic cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma when members of one group are unable to target punishment towards individual defectors from the other group. We first show that indiscriminate outgroup punishment may sustain cooperation in this setting. Our main result, however, is that the introduction of ingroup punishment in addition to outgroup punishment represents a better sanctioning institution in the sense that cooperative outcomes may persist in situations where outgroup punishment alone fails to induce cooperation. Our findings are consistent with historical evidence on the dynamics of interethnic conflicts.
Subjects: 
Interethnic conflicts
Interethnic cooperation
Ethnicity
Intergroup relations
Ingroup punishment
Outgroup punishment
JEL: 
C70
C72
O12
O17
Z13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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