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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1086
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers search for jobs in both the formal and the informal sector. We analyse the impact of higher punishment rates and a higher audit rate on labour market performance. We find that a higher punishment rate reduces the size of the informal sector and reduces unemployment. A higher audit rate has an ambiguous impact on unemployment, and may actually increase the size of the underground economy.
Schlagwörter: 
tax evasion
underground economy
matching
bargaining
unemployment
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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