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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 34/2001
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In practice, two types of tournaments can be distinguished - U-type and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments, workers receive prizes that have been fixed in advance. In J-type tournaments, the employer fixes an aggregate wage bill in advance, which is then shared among the workers according to their relative performance. The results of the paper show that the outcomes of the two tournament types substantially differ. Especially, an employer will prefer J-type to U-type tournaments if the number of workers is large, whereas the opposite holds for small numbers of workers.
Schlagwörter: 
collusion
human capital
relative deprivation
tournaments
JEL: 
J3
M1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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