Cooperation as a Result of Learning with Aspiration Levels

Oechssler, Jörg

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/78416

Title:

Cooperation as a Result of Learning with Aspiration Levels

Authors:

Oechssler, Jörg

Year of Publication:

2001

Series/Report no.:

Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 8/2001

Publisher:

University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn

Abstract:

It is shown that a win-stay, lose-hift behavior rule with endogenous aspiration levels yields cooperation in a certain class of games. The aspiration level in each round equals the current population average. The class of games includes the prisoner's dilemma and Cournot oligopoly and thus yields an explanation for cooperation and collusion.

Subjects:

cooperation

JEL:

C72
L13

Document Type:

Working Paper

Appears in Collections:

Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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