Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81904 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 258
Verlag: 
Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
A string of theoretical papers shows that the non-exclusivity of credit contracts generates important negative contractual externalities. Employing a unique dataset, we identify how these externalities affect the supply of credit. Using internal information on a creditor's willingness to lend, we find that a creditor reduces its credit supply when a borrower obtains a loan at another creditor (an outside loan). Consistent with the theoretical literature, the effect is more pronounced the larger the outside loans and it is muted if the initial creditor's existing and future loans retain seniority over the outside loans and are secured with valuable collateral.
Schlagwörter: 
non-exclusivity
contractual externalities
credit supply
debt seniority
JEL: 
G21
G34
L13
L14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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