Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92259 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] IZA Journal of Migration [ISSN:] 2193-9039 [Volume:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2013 [Pages:] 1-16
Verlag: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Who pays for immigration control? According to the Lisbon Treaty the cost of enforcing the European border against illegal immigration shall be shared among the EU members. Nonetheless, the Treaty is vague with respect to the 'appropriate measures' to adopt in order to distribute the financial burden. Members who do not share their borders with source countries have an incentive to free ride on the other countries. We study a novel contribution game in which a border country and a central country minimize a loss function with respect to their national immigration target. We consider both sequential and simultaneous decisions and we show that joint contribution occurs only if the immigration targets are not too different. Total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game, but the sequential framework reduces the incentive to free ride.
Schlagwörter: 
policy making
government expenditures
local government expenditures
federalism
programme evaluation
duration analysis
timing-of-events model
JEL: 
D78
H72
H77
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
877.73 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.