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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 137
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object's value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no depreciation during the bargaining process which involves signalling of private information. We characterise the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which is essentially unique if offers are required to be strictly increasing. Equilibrium agreement is reached gradually and nondeterministically. The better informed player obtains a rent.
Schlagwörter: 
Sequential bargaining
Common values
Incomplete information
Repeated games
JEL: 
C73
C78
D44
D82
J12
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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